98. The independence provisions set for IPN members are of high standards in line with
the independence afforded to this body. The Resolution (World Bank, 1993) provides that
Board officials, staff and consultants are ineligible to serve on the IPN unless “two years
have elapsed since the end of their service in the Bank Group” (World Bank, 1993; 83).
Panel members may only be removed by “decision by the Executive Directors, for cause”
(World Bank, 1993; 84). In contrast with IEG, which also reports to the Board, IPN
members serve a 5-year nonrenewable term. In the consultations held in the course of the
Review, internal and external stakeholders overwhelmingly pointed to this provision as
the single most important independence pillar.

99. The selection practice followed for the appointment of the current Executive
Secretary should be institutionalized. The Resolution (World Bank, 1993) states that
“[t]he President, after consultation with the Executive Directors, shall assign a staff
member to the Panel as Executive Secretary” (p. 2). In light of the key role that the
Panel’s Secretary has in this independent body, the selection procedure should reflect full
ownership by the Panel. In practice, this procedure was reportedly followed in the
appointment of the current Secretary through a selection process led by the Panel and
including the Chair of CODE and a representative of civil society, as an observer. The selected candidate was then approved by the President. In
institutionalizing such a practice, the Panel should be asked to consult with the President
and the relevant Board Committee, that is, CODE, with a civil society representative
serving as a full fledged member of the selection committee.

100. The independence provisions for the role of Executive Secretary need to be
tightened. The position description for the current Secretary states that “it is desirable that
the Executive Secretary be a final position for a person in the World Bank.” The IPN’s
Secretary is, in fact, allowed to re-join the Group staff upon termination of his or her
service with the Panel, as the Resolution (World Bank, 1993) is silent in that regard. This
is in contrast, for instance, with the two (two-year) cooling-off period required for the two
senior staff in CAO (see Sub-Section E). Moreover, this gap is inconsistent with the very
high bar set for the Panel members who are prevented from joining the Group staff for
life. As the Secretary has a fundamental role in reviewing complaints, assessing their
eligibility and carrying out investigations if warranted, he or she should be prevented
from immediately joining or re-joining the Group staff upon termination of service with
the Panel. This could be achieved by imposing a satisfactory cooling off period as done
by CAO.

84 “The President, in consultation with Executive Directors, would appoint a selection committee to lead
the process. The committee would include the chairman of the Committee on Development Effectiveness
(CODE), and the Dean or co-Dean of the Board, one Managing Director or Regional Vice President and the